When it comes to writing about the Iraq war, I've tried to follow a rule: avoid references to the Vietnam War. There certainly are similarities (instructive and not-so-instructive). For instance, it's easy to compare the hubris of the "best and the brightest" of the Vietnam generation with that of the neocons of the W. years. (And B&B posterboy Robert McNamara ended up at the World Bank, just as did Paul Wolfowitz, though McNamara managed not to be forced out in scandal.) Still, the Vietnam metaphor is too easy to deploy, and the world is different these days.

But--you knew a "but" was coming--I could not help but think of Vietnam when I read David Ignatius's column in Tuesday's Washington Post. The piece starts:

President Bush and his senior military and foreign policy advisers are beginning to discuss a "post-surge" strategy for Iraq that they hope could gain bipartisan political support. The new policy would focus on training and advising Iraqi troops rather than the broader goal of achieving a political reconciliation in Iraq, which senior officials recognize may be unachievable within the time available.

The revamped policy, as outlined by senior administration officials, would be premised on the idea that, as the current surge of U.S. troops succeeds in reducing sectarian violence, America's role will be increasingly to help prepare the Iraqi military to take greater responsibility for securing the country.

This does sound awfully familiar. It's essentially a reformulation of "we will stand down, as the Iraqis stand up." Bush has been saying that for years (literally). Yet if he does drop his goal of an at-peace and fully stable Iraq, that would be a change.

I'm glad to learn Bush is considering a Plan B. That would illustrate he's not as inflexible as he seems. But it might be too late for Plan B--or C or D. After years of training Iraqi troops, the US military has not demonstrated such an endeavor can be truly productive. More important, there's no telling the present surge will indeed reduce sectarian violence in a meaningful manner. And there's this little matter: who's in charge within Iraq? Ignatius writes:

"Sectarian violence is not a problem we can fix," said one senior official. "The Iraqi government needs to show that it can take control of the capital." U.S. officials offer a somber evaluation of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki: His Shiite-dominated government is weak and sectarian, but they have concluded that, going forward, there is no practical alternative.

If a new realism is indeed reigning, the administration is left with this (not-yet-announced) position: the US military cannot end the sectarian violence; only the Iraqis can achieve that; but the government in control may not be capable of doing so. Enter the dreaded Vietnam comparison. In the 1960s and 1970s, successive US administrations (Democratic and Republican) backed a series of corrupt and feckless governments in Saigon--all under the banner of it's-the-best-choice-we-have. The results were obvious.

In Iraq, Washington cannot do what Baghdad cannot do. That is the ugly and overarching reality. There will be no "post-surge" success, if there is no surge in Baghdad's ability to lessen sectarian violence and to mount an effective government. If the government of Nouri al-Maliki cannot succeed on these fronts, the United States will continue to waste lives, money and credibility within Iraq. One lesson of Vietnam is that you cannot win if you are backing losers.

SEE YOU IN SEPTEMBER. For our See You in September File (see the posting below), reader Micki sends the following from a CQ Today article on the Iraq war spending bill under construction in the Senate:

Republicans offered to accept a proposal by Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., requiring Bush to produce reports in July and September on the Iraqi government's progress toward certain benchmarks. Unless he certified that they were moving forward, reconstruction aid would be withheld.

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Please send other September warnings, and comments, tips, leads, and complaints to cornblog@hotmail.com. The comments section of this blog was deactivated several months ago, due to repeated hack-attacks on the site. A new comments section may appear in the near-future.

Posted by David Corn at May 22, 2007 10:12 AM