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December 29, 2006

Bush: Blame the Doubters

What's the problem with George W. Bush's policy in Iraq? He appears to believe that the issue is not that his administration is doing anything wrong but that folks simply don't understand what's at stake in Iraq. After meeting with his national security team in Crawford, Texas, on Thursday, Bush, flanked by Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, and General Peter Pace, issued a brief statement to reporters. He called Gates' recent trip to Iraq "an important part of coming to closure on a way forward in Iraq." And Bush thanked Gates for providing him with an "important briefing," but he provided no clue on which "way forward" he prefers, though news reports say Bush is considering increasing troops up to 20,000.

Bush went on to say:

And so we'll continue to consult with the Iraqis. I'm going to talk to Congress--not only will I continue to reach out to Congress, but members of my team will do so, as well. I fully understand it's important to have both Republicans and Democrats understanding the importance of this mission. It's important for the American people to understand success in Iraq is vital for our own security.

In a three-minute statement, Bush used the word "important" six times. And he revealed how views consultation with Congress. He's not interested in forging a policy with legislators. Instead, he wants to make sure they realize that what he's doing is "important." The same goes for American citizens--most of whom now believe that Bush was wrong to invade Iraq and that he has mismanaged the war. They don't get it, Bush seems to be saying, they just don't see how "important" this war.

Does Bush not understand that he has lost the PR war over the war and that it's a bit late to be arguing the importance of the mission. The public has turned on him and his war. He should worry less about persuasion and more about policy.

Posted by David Corn at 11:56 AM

December 27, 2006

In-the-Ground Truth in Iran?

In the past few days, I've been overwhelmed by a family matter. More on that later. So posting has been irregular--even by holiday standards. But let me make a quick observation. The most important news story of this week (so far) was an 8-paragraph piece buried on p. A9 of yesterday's Washington Post. The Associated Press story reported:

Iran is suffering a staggering decline in revenue from its oil exports, and if the trend continues income could virtually disappear by 2015, according to an analysis published Monday in a journal of the National Academy of Sciences.

Iran's economic woes could make the country unstable and vulnerable, with its oil industry crippled, Roger Stern, an economic geographer at Johns Hopkins University, said in the report and in an interview.

Iran earns about $50 billion a year in oil exports. The decline is estimated at 10 to 12 percent annually. In less than five years exports could be halved and then disappear by 2015, Stern predicted.

Hold on. If this is true, it changes the popular conception of the ongoing Iran crisis. In the conventional view, Iran is enriching uranium for one reason alone: so it can become a nuclear power, dominate the Middle East, and threaten the Israel and the United States. The Iran war hawks (formerly known as the Iraq war hawks) scoff at the notion that Iran might have other motives for enriching uranium. They dismiss Iran's claim that it is processing uranium as part of a civilian nuclear energy program. With all that oil? the hawks argue. No way.

The supposed implausibility of Iran's argument has been fueling the move toward confrontation--that is, war. And in recent weeks I've spoken to several outside-the-administration Iran experts who believe the Bush White House is intent on military action against Iran--probably air strikes. Yet what if the Iranians are essentially telling the truth?

I have no sympathy for the repressive theocrats of Tehran and do not counsel taking them at their word. But before there is another march to war, there ought to be close scrutiny of the reasons for that march.

The rest of the AP story depicts a more nuanced situation than the one depicted by the beaters of the drums of war:

Stern's analysis, which appears in this week's edition of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, supports U.S. and European suspicions that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons in violation of international understandings. But, Stern says, there could be merit to Iran's assertion that it needs nuclear power for civilian purposes "as badly as it claims."

He said oil production is declining and both gas and oil are being sold domestically at highly subsidized rates. At the same time, Iran is neglecting to reinvest in its oil production.

"With an explosive demand at home and poor management, the appeal of nuclear power, financed by Russia, could fill a real need for production of more electricity."

Iran produces about 3.7 million barrels a day, about 300,000 barrels below the quota set for Iran by the oil cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

The shortfall represents a loss of about $5.5 billion a year, Stern said. In 2004, Iran's oil profits were 65 percent of the government's revenues.

"If we look at that shortfall, and failure to rectify leaks in their refineries, that adds up to a loss of about $10 billion to $11 billion a year," he said. "That is a picture of an industry in collapse."

If the United States can "hold its breath" for a few years it may find Iran a much more conciliatory country, he said. And that, Stern said, is good reason to belay any instinct to take on Iran militarily.

"What they are doing to themselves is much worse than anything we could do," he said.

"The one thing that would unite the country right now is to bomb them," Stern said. "Here is one problem that might solve itself."

Doing nothing--starting no war--and solving a problem? That sounds pretty damn good. Whether Stern is right or not, what's happening within Iran deserves far more coverage within the US media. Without more information, the public will not be able to evaluate--or challenge--the next case for war.

Posted by David Corn at 07:40 PM

December 26, 2006

Bush No Churchill

I'm not looking forward to another John Kerry presidential run. But he did make a good point in his defense of flip-flopping, published in yesterday's Washington Post. For years, conservative war cheerleaders have claimed Winston Churchill as a patron saint, portraying the ol' English bulldog as the epitome of wartime determination and citing him as a model of never-waver leadership. In this article calling for George W. Bush to change his administration's Iraq policy, Kerry notes that Churchill was not merely bullheaded and places one of Churchill's stirring remarks in its proper context:

President Bush and all of us who grew up in the shadows of World War II remember Winston Churchill -- his grit, his daring, his resolve. I remember listening to his speeches on a vinyl album in the pre-iPod era. Two years ago I spoke about Iraq at Westminster College in Fulton, Mo., where Churchill had drawn a line between freedom and fear in his "iron curtain" speech. In preparation, I reread some of the many words from various addresses that made him famous. Something in one passage caught my eye. When Churchill urged, "Never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never -- in nothing, great or small, large or petty, never give in," he added: "except to convictions of honour and good sense."

This is a time for such convictions.

Indeed. But for Bush to reconsider the wisdom of his actions in Iraq would be rather surprising. In his book, that would hardly qualify as Churchillian.

Posted by David Corn at 10:05 AM

December 21, 2006

Asleep in the Bunker

The other day, during his end-of-the-year press conference, George W. Bush said he would happily consult with military commanders, members of Congress (even Democrats!) and other experts about what to do in Iraq. But note how he framed this open-mindedness: "I am willing to follow a path that leads to victory." Just as he was making that remark, TomPaine.com was posting my latest "Loyal Opposition" column. Here it is.

Bush, Asleep In The Bunker
David Corn
December 20, 2006
www.tompaine.com

I'm sleeping a lot better than people would assume.
--George W. Bush
Don Rumsfeld is the finest Secretary of Defense this nation has ever had.
--Dick Cheney

This is scary. The president of the United States of America has created a hellish disaster that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians and thousands of American soldiers, and he's resting well. The vice president believes that the man responsible for three of the greatest military blunders in U.S. history (attacking Iraq without devising a strategy for securing the country after the invasion; dissolving the Iraqi army, creating armed and trained recruits for the incipient insurgency; and mounting an extensive de-Baathification campaign that destroyed the governing infrastructure of the nation) did his job well.

Such comments suggest that the two people in charge of this country are not living in denial but detachment. They must realize that Iraq is a mess perhaps beyond remedy. But that doesn't seem to affect them. How can that be?

Bush and Cheney are in the bunker. The American public has rendered a judgment on the war and Bush and Cheney's management of it which is: not worth it, and you blew it. Washington's policy poohbahs--with the release of the Iraq Study Group report--pronounced the war practically lost. (Bush, showing more than he intended, said of the report, "To show you how important this [report] is, I read it." Still, he rejected its key Hail-Mary proposals.) Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the nation's number-one Johnny-come-lately, seconded the Iraq Study Group's conclusion that the United States is losing in Iraq. And all this occurred before the recent news that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the White House cannot define the military mission in Iraq, that attacks against Iraqi and American troops are (once again) up, and that the Pentagon considers Shiite militants, not the Sunni insurgency, as the most grave threat in Iraq (meaning the Bush administration is supporting a government run by Shiites unable or unwilling to control Shiite death squads).

Bush seems unable to grapple with the worsening situation in Iraq. Apparently lacking ideas of his own, he held high-profile meetings with military commanders and experts to ponder options. And this was front-page news. (Shouldn't the president regularly be talking to his commanders and outside experts about the Iraq dilemma?) Yet this chatter produced nothing immediate. Bush delayed a speech in which he supposedly will announce changes in his Iraq policy. The bottom line: The commander in chief had no clear notion of his own about what to do next.

As the Iraq Study Group showed, there are no new big--or promising--ideas for Iraq. The report produced by the panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton was infused with not only realism but also pessimism. It noted the fundamental challenge is resolving the deeply rooted sectarian conflict causing much of the violence in Iraq. Yet the report said, "Many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq." If that is indeed the case, the main proposals of the commission--enhance the training of Iraqi security forces, withdraw combat troops slowly (if conditions permit), and conduct a diplomatic blitz--will not likely produce much. After all, why bother to train the security forces of a government driven by sectarian strife? (Might U.S. forces end up training militia loyalists?) The Baker report--quite purposefully--avoided talk of victory in Iraq. The mission per Baker is to clean up the mess (somewhat) and get the United States out.

That is not, I am guessing, how Bush views the matter. He cannot concede he's made that mess. He cannot let go of his grandiose (post-weapons of mass destruction) justification for bringing death and chaos to Iraq: Turning Iraq into a stable beacon of democracy and spreading freedom and positive change throughout the region. (Of course, the opposite appears to be happening. Arab moderates have been weakened by the Iraq war, and existing conflicts in the area have been intensified by the war.) So here's the bad news: Bush is in a hole and he will keep on digging.

Bush is not interested in extrication. (No thank you, Mr. Baker.) He wants that victory. Consequently, he's going to be more interested in listening to anyone who says there is a path to victory than anyone who counsels there is way (maybe) to minimize the damage done. And since any alternative to the present course, including a minimize-the-damage-done plan, carries with it the risk of dangerous consequences (withdrawing U.S. troops could lead to more chaos in Iraq and the onset of regional conflict), Bush probably figures he might as well pursue a plan with some promise--however illusory--of victory.

It's no surprise, then, that the White House seems to be leaning toward a "surge"--sending thousands of troops into Baghdad in a desperate attempt to stifle the sectarian violence there, if only temporarily. The Pentagon opposes doing so. And such an action, as Powell, the Iraq Study Group, General John Abizaid, the Central Command chief, have noted, is unlikely to address the fundamental factors shaping and driving the sectarian warfare. But by ordering a surge, Bush could play the role of the decisive decider-in-chief, willing to make the hard call necessary for triumph.

As Bush and Cheney plot the way ahead in that bunker, they are dismissing the Baker report and holding on fast to the belief they did the right thing and this will all end up well. It's easy to envision them bucking not only Baker and Daddy Bush's realist pals but the military, Nervous-Nellie Republicans in the Congress, and, yes, the American public. Days before the elections, Cheney laid out the White House strategy when he said that the Bush administration will pursue its Iraq policy "full speed ahead." Despite the election results, the Baker report, and the ever-deteriorating reality in Iraq, Bush shows no signs of revising his basic approach. It is full speed ahead--perhaps until he can dump this war on another president in January 2009--and damn the consequences.

Posted by David Corn at 03:53 PM

December 19, 2006

Cheney To Testify--Really?

The Associated Press reports:

Vice President Dick Cheney will be called as a defense witness in the CIA leak case, an attorney for Cheney's former chief of staff told a federal judge Tuesday.

"We're calling the vice president," attorney Ted Wells said in court. Wells represents defendant I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who is charged with perjury and obstruction.

There are many ways to deconstruct this. Will Cheney willingly be coming to Libby's rescue by testifying that his chief of staff was so busy with top-secret national security stuff that he could not remember to tell the truth to FBI agents and a federal grand jury investigating the leak that outed Valerie (Plame) Wilson as an undercover CIA officer? That would be one helluva favor, for Cheney will probably be grilled by special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald about his role in the White House's campaign against Joe Wilson, which led in part to the Plame leak. After all, it was Cheney who first told Libby that Valerie Wilson worked at the Counterproliferation Division of the clandestine Operations Directorate of the CIA, and Libby passed on or confirmed information about her CIA connection to two reporters (Judith Miller of The New York Times and Matt Cooper of Time.) Such questioning could be uncomfortable for Cheney.

Or is the Libby legal team-in a ploy--calling to the stand a witness who'd rather not be there? If so, how might this affect the odds of a presidential pardon for Libby (either before or after the trial). It could encourage the White House to consider such a step--in order to keep Cheney out of the harm's way. Or it could piss off the White House and damper enthusiasm at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue for a Libby pardon.

From the outside, it's hard to know which scenario is closest to the truth. But should a courtroom appearance by Cheney come to pass, it will be yet another dramatic twist in the long-running saga of the Plame affair--and one that will probably not play well for the White House.

Posted by David Corn at 11:56 PM

December 18, 2006

At Sea

I'm traveling this week--on The Nation cruise. Posting will be intermittent, at best. The buffet bar calls....

Posted by David Corn at 02:03 PM

December 16, 2006

George W. Bush Slept Here

In an interview with People, George W. Bush gave Americans more reason to wonder about the man. Look at this exchange:

Q: A lot of readers asked how you shut off the day's events. Do you ever take sleep aids?

THE PRESIDENT: Generally not. But occasionally when I travel, I'm expected to get on an airplane and fly eight hours and pop out and be fresh and diplomatic and on message. If I'm having trouble sleeping, I'll take a sleep aid. But I must tell you, I'm sleeping a lot better than people would assume.

If you had launched a war on false premises and thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were dead as a result, how well would you sleep? Most people would be haunted by such circumstances. Not this fellow--if he can be taken at his word.

And Bush dodged a tough question:

This year, we invited readers on our Web site to ask you questions. Here's one: Nina Frazier of New Braunfels, Texas, asks: If you believe in the war, why didn't you encourage your own daughters to fight for your country? Or did you?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe Americans can contribute to the security and well-being of our country in a variety of ways. That's why we have a volunteer army. What we say to young people is that if you want to serve your country you can do so in the military, or you can do so by teaching children in inner-city Washington, D.C., like one of our daughters did. Or you can help form education programs in New York City, like our (other) daughter. There are all kinds of ways to serve.

Wait a sec. Bush claims the war in Iraq is essential to the survival of the United States--and the entire Western world. Yet he doesn't ask his daughters to make a sacrifice for the fight. And he asks no one else--except those who have already volunteered for military duty--to kick in. No one has to pay higher taxes to support this war. No one has to use less energy. No one has to shop less. It's a fight for our existence--but Uncle Sam doesn't need you.

Posted by David Corn at 10:26 AM

The Waiting Game

Here's a piece of mine in the new issue of The Nation that looks at the congressional Democrats' plans regarding Iraq....

The Waiting Game
by DAVID CORN
[from the January 1, 2007 issue]
The Nation

First, Washington waited--and waited--for the Iraq Study Group report. Once the bipartisan panel issued its verdict (the war is nearly lost) and unveiled its not so impressive seventy-nine recommendations (withdraw combat troops by early 2008 if conditions permit; boost training for an Iraqi military yet to demonstrate coherence, competence or loyalty to a working government; lean on that fractured Iraqi government to achieve national reconciliation; talk to Iran and Syria), the capital redirected the waiting game at George W. Bush, who promised to offer his own plan after New Year's. But few policy-meisters within the Beltway expect a major shift from the White House. (Incoming Senate majority leader Harry Reid met with Bush and concluded, according to spokesman Jim Manley, that Bush is "not interested in any dramatic change.") So Washington could soon be waiting for another set of players to weigh in: the Democrats. Come early January, the party will have the power to do more than grouse about the war. But anyone anticipating quick and decisive action from the Dems will have to keep waiting.

In the new Congress there will be much Iraq-related activity, but the Democrats will present no master plan to remove America from the debacle. They will mount a flurry of hearings, scrutinize the war budget and introduce differing bills. Senators Carl Levin, Joseph Biden and Jay Rockefeller--incoming chairs, respectively, of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees--plan an array of hearings. Levin aims to examine the military strategy in Iraq. He might continue his quest to dig up information on the Pentagon cell, created by former Under Secretary Douglas Feith, that funneled misleading intelligence to the White House before the war. Biden, who has proposed turning Iraq into a federation of three autonomous regions, intends to examine alternate policies. Rockefeller is looking to complete the long-delayed Phase II inquiry of the Administration's use (or abuse) of prewar intelligence.

On the House side, Jack Murtha, who will take over the defense appropriations subcommittee, wants to probe misuse of reconstruction spending. Henry Waxman, next chair of the Government Reform Committee, will zero in on fraud, waste and abuse in military contracting. Tom Lantos, incoming chair of the International Relations Committee, also wants to probe the reconstruction failure. And Ike Skelton, in line to head Armed Services, has vowed to examine the strain the war has put on the military and the adequacy of assistance to the troops.

Although Reid and Speaker-to-be Nancy Pelosi are trying to coordinate the hearings on their respective sides of the Capitol, they could become a hodgepodge. "At the moment, we are focused specifically on the first two weeks, which will be the 'Six in '06' priorities," says a Pelosi aide, referring to legislation on domestic issues Pelosi hopes to pass immediately. It might have been wise for the Democrats to plan one prominent set of joint hearings, a series that would focus on all Iraq matters. But that's not how a Congress full of hard-to-control chiefs tends to operate.

Before, after or during this blitz of hearings, the Dems may introduce legislation pressuring Bush to start disengaging from Iraq. Senator Levin, who advocates a troop withdrawal starting within four to six months, estimates that there are at least fifty senators who would vote for such a measure, and he says several Republican senators have expressed interest.

Levin, Biden and Reid are all touting the possibility of a bipartisan resolution urging Bush to change course--a prospect enhanced by several Senate GOPers who recently broke with the White House: Chuck Hagel called on Bush to "begin planning for a phased troop withdrawal"; Gordon Smith decried Bush's Iraq policy as "absurd," noting that it "may even be criminal" and urging a withdrawal "quicker rather than later"; Sam Brownback demanded that Bush lean on the Iraqi government to achieve a "political equilibrium," even if that entails partitioning the country.

Legislators can pass resolutions demanding that Bush remake his Iraq policy, but the Decider in Chief is free to ignore them. Congress has power only over the war's financing. This spring the Bush White House is expected to ask for another $100 billion or so for the war. But Democratic Senate and House leaders have said they have no interest in compelling a withdrawal by choking off funds. Representative Jim McGovern, a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts, has been pushing legislation for the past year that would defund the war. The House leadership, he says, "does not have a lot of sympathy for this. Some Democrats do not want to be blamed for losing Iraq." McGovern, whose bill has drawn only nineteen supporters, notes that many Democrats still hope Bush will disengage so they don't have to do the heavy lifting of forcing a pullout. "But," he adds, "the Bush strategy is to push the war on to the next Administration. There will be action [by the Democratic-controlled Congress], but not enough to extricate ourselves."

Pelosi, Reid, Levin, Murtha and most Democrats advocate withdrawal in some form. The question is, How hard will they push? "We're going to continue to hold the President's feet to the fire," says Manley, Reid's spokesman. But, he adds, "at the end there's only so much we can do." Which means the waiting--and the war--will likely continue.

Posted by David Corn at 12:11 AM

December 15, 2006

More Evidence of a Cooked-Up Case for War

For some journalists, it's not old news that the United States and England cooked the case for war in Iraq. The Independent of England has an important story out on this front. Here's the lede:

The Government's case for going to war in Iraq has been torn apart by the
publication of previously suppressed evidence that Tony Blair lied over Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

A devastating attack on Mr. Blair's justification for military action by Carne Ross, Britain's key negotiator at the UN, has been kept under wraps until now because he was threatened with being charged with breaching the Official Secrets Act.

In the testimony revealed today Mr. Ross, 40, who helped negotiate several UN security resolutions on Iraq, makes it clear that Mr. Blair must have known Saddam Hussein possessed no weapons of mass destruction. He said that during his posting to the UN, "at no time did HMG [Her Majesty's Government] assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests."

The paper also published Ross' entire prepared testimony. It is indeed rather devastating. This story is a reminder (hint, hint, congressional Democrats) that even though the Senate intelligence committee and a White House commission (a.k.a. the Silberman-Robb commission) examined U.S. intelligence failures regarding the Iraq's supposed WMDs and the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, there is plenty more to probe—particularly how the Bush administration represented (that is, misrepresented) the intelligence and how administration officials made the decision to lead the United States into the debacle in Iraq. Of course, as the co-author of a book on this subject, I have a particular interest. But there's been no greater strategic U.S. blunder in years. The public deserves a full accounting--one even fuller than Hubris.

Here are excerpts of Ross's testimony:

I am in the Senior Management Structure of the FCO, currently seconded to the UN in Kosovo. I was First Secretary in the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York from December 1997 until June 2002. I was responsible for Iraq policy in the mission, including policy on sanctions, weapons inspections and liaison with UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC.

During that time, I helped negotiate several UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 1284 which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC (an acronym I coined late one New York night during the year-long negotiation). I took part in policy debates within HMG and in particular with the US government. I attended many policy discussions on Iraq with the US State Department in Washington, New York and London....

I read the available UK and US intelligence on Iraq every working day for the four and a half years of my posting. This daily briefing would often comprise a thick folder of material, both humint and sigint. I also talked often and at length about Iraq's WMD to the international experts who comprised the inspectors of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC, whose views I would report to London. In addition, I was on many occasions asked to offer views in contribution to Cabinet Office assessments, including the famous WMD dossier (whose preparation began some time before my departure in June 2002).

During my posting, at no time did HMG assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests. On the contrary, it was the commonly-held view among the officials dealing with Iraq that any threat had been effectively contained. I remember on several occasions the UK team stating this view in terms during our discussions with the US (who agreed). (At the same time, we would frequently argue, when the US raised the subject, that "regime change" was inadvisable, primarily on the grounds that Iraq would collapse into chaos.)

Any assessment of threat has to include both capabilities and intent. Iraq's capabilities in WMD were moot: many of the UN's weapons inspectors (who, contrary to popular depiction, were impressive and professional) would tell me that they believed Iraq had no significant materiel. With the exception of some unaccounted-for Scud missiles, there was no intelligence evidence of significant holdings of CW, BW or nuclear material. Aerial or satellite surveillance was unable to get under the roofs of Iraqi facilities. We therefore had to rely on inherently unreliable human sources (who, for obvious reasons, were prone to exaggerate).

Without substantial evidence of current holdings of WMD, the key concern we pursued was that Iraq had not provided any convincing or coherent account of its past holdings. When I was briefed in London at the end of 1997 in preparation for my posting, I was told that we did not believe that Iraq had any significant WMD. The key argument therefore to maintain sanctions was that Iraq had failed to provide convincing evidence of destruction of its past stocks.

Iraq's ability to launch a WMD or any form of attack was very limited. There were approx 12 or so unaccounted-for Scud missiles; Iraq's airforce was depleted to the point of total ineffectiveness; its army was but a pale shadow of its earlier might; there was no evidence of any connection between Iraq and any terrorist organisation that might have planned an attack using Iraqi WMD (I do not recall any occasion when the question of a terrorist connection was even raised in UK/US discussions or UK internal debates).

There was moreover no intelligence or assessment during my time in the job that Iraq had any intention to launch an attack against its neighbours or the UK or US. I had many conversations with diplomats representing Iraq's neighbours. With the exception of the Israelis, none expressed any concern that they might be attacked. Instead, their concern was that sanctions, which they and we viewed as an effective means to contain Iraq, were being delegitimised by evidence of their damaging humanitarian effect.

I quizzed my colleagues in the FCO and MOD working on Iraq on several occasions about the threat assessment in the run-up to the war. None told me that any new evidence had emerged to change our assessment; what had changed was the government's determination to present available evidence in a different light. I discussed this at some length with David Kelly in late 2002, who agreed that the Number 10 WMD dossier was overstated....

I proposed on several occasions the establishment of a multinational body (a UN body, if we could get the Security Council to agree it) to police sanctions busting. I proposed coordinated action with Iraq's neighbours to pressure them to help, including by controlling imports into Iraq. I held talks with a US Treasury expert on financial sanctions, an official who had helped trace and seize Milosevic's illegal financial assets. He assured me that, given the green light, he could quickly set up a team to target Saddam's illegal accounts.

These proposals went nowhere. Inertia in the FCO and the inattention of key ministers combined to the effect that the UK never made any coordinated and sustained attempt to address sanctions busting....Coordinated, determined and sustained action to prevent illegal exports and target Saddam's illegal monies would have consumed a tiny proportion of the effort and resources of the war (and fewer lives), but could have provided a real alternative. It was never attempted.

Imagine if US officials were as candid. The Democrats about to take over the House and Senate intelligence and foreign relations committees ought to compel such candor.

Posted by David Corn at 08:57 AM

December 14, 2006

Watch this Space

I'm traveling. Will be back soon.

Posted by David Corn at 11:43 AM

December 12, 2006

Impeachment: Continuing a Debate

Impeachment--it's not one of my favorite subjects. I've counseled progressives and Democrats to focus on other matters. But when my editors at TomPaine.com requested that I participate in a debate on impeachment, I had little choice. (You have to pay the piper.) Their idea was to twin an anti piece (mine) with a pro piece by Jennifer Van Bergen, who was subsequently identified by the site as "a journalist with a law degree."

My argument was predictable: impeachment is a political loser--especially among independent and in-the-middle voters necessary for Democratic victories down the road. Here's an excerpt:

Impeachment is a substitute--a wishful shortcut?--for the difficult legislating and organizing that the Democratic Party and progressives must do to win the country in 2008. The Dems have a window of opportunity at the moment to show the public what Democratic governance looks like. They should investigate the Bush administration on many fronts, including how Bush misrepresented the prewar intelligence and how he bungled the war, as well as Bush's expansive claims of executive power and how he has put such imperial thinking into practice (wiretaps, detentions, etc.). Perhaps such investigations will produce information or a showdown (say, the White House refusing to turn over information to Congress) that would strengthen the legal and political cases for impeachment. But in order to create a lasting and positive relationship with the electorate, Democrats must deliver legislatively and produce significant bills that connect with the concerns of Americans. That's job No. 1.

The Dems will have about 10 minutes to rebrand themselves when the new Congress convenes. Impeachment will be a serious impediment to that effort. Worse, it would become a black hole from which little, if any, political energy could escape. It would trump all else. After the recent elections, the congressional Democrats have Bush and the Republicans at a disadvantage; they have (as the cliche goes) the political capital of the moment. Spending it on impeachment would be a waste.

You can read the whole piece here.

Van Bergen took what struck me as an odd approach. She wrote

Impeachment proceedings are not the beginning but the end result of a healing process for the nation that needs to begin now.

Healing? In her short piece, she referred to impeachment as "healing" three times. Say what you want of impeachment--it's warranted, its necessary--but most people would not consider it an action of healing. It may be an act of accountability, but it also is an act of punishment or retribution. More to the point, it would likely be a divisive political battle. There's nothing wrong per se about political combat; often it's called for--but not under the banner of healing.

Bergen claims there is a "tremendous groundswell for impeachment." I question that. Dear reader, how many of your friends, relatives, and workplace colleagues have recently asked you, "When is that new Democratic Congress gonna start impeaching George Bush"? Barack Obama is a groundswell. Impeachment is not.

Van Bergen also argues:

There is a great sense of powerlessness and rage that the populace expressed strongly through the midterm elections. But more than elections are needed to address the deep concerns so many people have. A nagging malaise, a gray depression has afflicted the country, and ordinary people--those who are not politicians or journalists or activists or lawyers--have no outlet for these feelings and no sense of remedy.

"A gray depression?" I do not see that at the mall. And if the populace, as she suggests, just expressed its rage "strongly" at the ballot box in November--an overstatement in my view--then there is an outlet for this disgust and anger: voting. Van Bergen is making a case based on what she discerns The People want--or, perhaps more accurately, what she wants The People to want. Let me make a crude point: place a documentary about the possible impeachment of George W. Bush up against an episode of Dancing with the Stars, and what do you think depressed, rage-full populace will chose? (You can read her entire piece here.)

Van Bergen is arguing a desire, not a clear-eyed case. With such advocates, the impeachment movement is unlikely to win over those not already with it.

Posted by David Corn at 08:49 PM

December 11, 2006

Augusto and Jeane

Was it a cosmic coincidence that Jeane Kirkpatrick and Augusto Pinochet died within days of one another? (I'll skip the nearly obligatory comment about a post-earthly reunion.) Given all the flattering obits the former UN ambassador received, the final departure of the Chilean dictator was a timely reminder that Kirkpatrick cozied up to murderers and torturers. In fact, she provided the Reagan administration--in which she served--with the theoretical framework for bear-hugging brutes.

In a famous--or infamous--1979 Commentary article entitled "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Kirkpatrick distinguished between communist dictatorships and "right-wing autocracies," maintaining that the latter were, in a way, less evil, because they could evolve into democracies, while communist totalitarian states could not. Washington, she advised, should not worry so much about human rights abuses within these autocracies. Her argument justified the Reagan cold warrior's embrace of anti-communist, pro-American dictatorships, such as the military juntas ruling Argentina and Chile, the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Because these repressive governments were merely right-wing autocracies and not left-wing totalitarian regimes, the Reaganites could welcome them into the anti-communist crusade and use them as allies in the struggle against the Soviet Union--no matter what these tyrants did to their own society and citizens.

In Argentina and Chile, the fascistic military dictatorships Kirkpatrick supported slaughtered, disappeared and tortured thousands of citizens of people. As the National Security Archive notes:

A post-junta truth commission found that the Argentine military had "disappeared" at least 10,000 Argentines in the so-called "dirty war" against "subversion" and "terrorists" between 1976 and 1983; human rights groups in Argentina put the number at closer to 30,000.

The Argentina generals were especially fond of torture and had a taste for going after Jews, whom they believed were members of a worldwide communist conspiracy. Yet Kirkpatrick was willing to put this all aside and even attended a dinner--thrown to honor her--at the Argentine embassy in Washington the night Argentina foolishly invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982.

As for Chile, the Reagan administration and Kirkpatrick treated Pinochet, who overthrew an elected president, as a friend, even though Pinochet's thugs murdered thousands and tortured tens of thousands.

The Washington Post noted Pinochet's brutality in its front-page report of his demise. Yet its obituary of Kirkpatrick whited-out her fancy for murderous leaders like Pinochet and the Argentine generals. It described her work as UN ambassador this way:

An influential voice in the development of administration policies toward Central America, Kirkpatrick supported the military junta in El Salvador and was an ardent supporter of anti-Sandinista rebels fighting the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua. She helped develop the covert plan to provide $19 million in aid to the contras.

Not a mention of Pinochet and Chile, nothing about her anti-Semitic allies in Argentina.

I seem to recall years ago writing something particularly nasty about Kirkpatrick--words to the effect that she should not be allowed to discuss foreign policy until she had her private parts exposed to electric shock, a common practice employed by the autocrats she supped with. It's customary to speak no ill of the dead. But history never dies. And Kirkpatrick ought to be remembered for all that she accomplished--and all that she defended and enabled.

Posted by David Corn at 11:44 AM

December 08, 2006

A Question for Dick Cheney: Family Values or Family Honor?/Remembering the Day Lennon Died

The religious right has a message for Dick Cheney: your daughter is selfish and a danger. Why? Because she is having a baby. After hearing that Mary Cheney, a lesbian in a committed relationship, is expecting to give birth, Janice Crouse of Concerned Women of American declared, "Not only is she doing a disservice to her child, she's voiding all the effort her father put into the Bush administration." Carrie Gordon Earll, a policy analyst for Focus on the Family huffed, "Just because you can conceive a child outside a one-woman, one-man marriage doesn't mean it's a good idea. Love can't replace a mother and a father." (During the 2004 presidential campaign, Focus on the Family chieftain James Dobson whacked John Kerry for having mentioned Mary Cheney's sexual orientation during one of the presidential debates: "It wasn't fair. It was an invasion of her privacy.") Now comes this press release:

Mary Cheney Cruel to Children

COLORADO SPRINGS, Dec. 8 /Christian Newswire/ -- Mary Cheney, the Vice President's unmarried daughter, is expecting. Dr. Paul Cameron, Chairman of the Family Research Institute, a Colorado Springs think-tank, condemned her decision:

"Unmarried women should not deliberately have children. Their children are more apt to experience privation and disruption. Consequently, such children are more apt to do poorly in school, disrupt society (e.g., engage in criminality), and be personally troubled. These wrongs are compounded when the child is brought into a homosexual setting."

"By this selfish action, Cheney is not merely disrupting society, she is being cruel to her child:

* Mary, 37, is currently 'partnered' with Heather Poe, 45. The median age of death for lesbians is around the late 50's. If Poe and Cheney stay together, odds are this child will lose at least one caretaker before graduating high school.

* Children of homosexuals testify that day-to-day living is more difficult – and they are more apt to report personal disturbance as a consequence.

* A high proportion of lesbian 'partnerings' break apart -- with custody issues haunting the child for the rest of his life.

* The child will disproportionately associate with homosexuals – who are as a class considerably more apt to have STDs and a criminal history, be interested in sex with children, involved in substance abuse, etc.

* The child will have a much higher probability of learning homosexual tastes (at least a third of lesbian's children adopt homosexuality).

* "Her pregnancy is further evidence that participation in homosexual activity distorts value systems, inducing practitioners to harm the commonweal. Our society already has too many children born without the benefits of marriage; Cheney's action is not only a bad example, but poor treatment of an innocent child."

In case you haven't already guessed, the work of the Family Research Institute--which has been cited by Patrick Buchanan and William Bennett--has been discredited. But in 1985 Cameron appeared at the annual Conservative Political Action Committee conference in Washington--the yearly shindig for rightwing activists and leaders--and called for pondering the possible "extermination" of homosexuals to stop the spread of AIDS. Dick Cheney, by the way, has often appeared at the CPAC conference.

Here's the question: is Dick Cheney going to come to his daughter's defense and tell the religious right to get lost? Or will he wimpishly stay silent in deference to political calculation? Forget family values, what about family honor?

A SAD DAY. December 8th always gets to me. It's the day John Lennon was shot and killed. For my generation--actually several generations--the real day the music died. (Sorry, Buddy Holly and Don McLean). Last year, I wrote a remembrance of that day and my response to the murder, which led to a political action against the NRA. Here it is again:

Twenty-five years ago today, John Lennon was shot dead outside the Dakota apartment building in New York City. He died about 11:00 pm. In those days, news was not so instantaneous. It wasn't until the next morning that many people--myself included--learned of this horrific event. At that time, I was working at the Center for the Study of Responsive Law in Washington, DC--otherwise known as the office of Ralph Nader. I was taking a year off from college.

The news that morning hit me--and millions of others--hard. After stumbling into the office--a rabbit warren of offices, some separated by walls made of cartons containing remaindered books produced by the Nader operation--I was asked to deliver a letter from Nader to President Carter. We didn't fax back then. I don't recall what the letter was about, but Nader was probably again blasting Carter, who at this point was a lame duck preparing to vacate the White House after losing to Ronald Reagan the previous month, for failing the public interest on some regulatory matter. I didn't mind the assignment. I didn't feel much like working or talking to anyone. It was a cold morning and about half a mile walk. I could stretch this mundane delivery task into an hour of solitude.

I walked down 16th Street NW, and within a few blocks I passed the headquarters of the National Rifle Association, an entire building next to one of Washington's lovely traffic circles. I stared at the building. My sadness and numbness slid into anger. I didn't know yet that Lennon's killer, Mark David Chapman, had purchased the .38-caliber handgun with which he shot Lennon, at a Hawaii gun store despite having a record of mental illness. But I did know that the NRA and its allies in the gun industry were one of the most powerful lobbies in town and that their primary concern was easy access to weapons. I started talking to the imposing building. No, I said, no, you're not going to get off scott-free here, no, no way. And an idea struck.

After dropping off the letter to Carter at one of the entrances to the White House, I hurried back to the office. I told Russell Mokhiber, one of the staffers and a veteran agitator, that I had decided to mount a protest rally outside the NRA's office. Here was a chance, I thought, to spur a debate on gun control. I wanted time off to organize the event. Mokhiber approached Nader, who said that would be fine, but that I should do it as a private citizen, not as an associate of the Center. That was fine by me. I immediately formed Citizens against Gun Violence, an "ad hoc citizens group."

CAGV--that is, me--quickly picked a date a few days hence for the event and designed a flyer advertising the rally. In recent weeks, there had been other examples of handgun violence in Washington. The brother of author David Halberstam, a local doctor, had been shot and killed by an intruder whom he had chased out of his home. And a popular community activist, a young African-American woman, had been shot dead, too. The flyer featured both of them and Lennon. And I asked a copy shop--no Kinko's back then--to print hundreds of copies on a super-rush basis. It could in those days take a day or two to get such a job done. The person at the counter looked at the material and said, "Come back in an hour."

CAGV grew in numbers, by which I mean that several interns at the Center and some friends of mine volunteered to put up flyers around town. Mokhiber went out and bought a bullhorn. I filed a permit application minutes before it was due. A local radio station announced that Lennon fans would be gathering at the end of the day on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. And as soon as the copies of the flyer were ready, I picked them up and headed toward the Lincoln Memorial.
There were several hundred people on the steps. One scrawny-looking fellow was in the middle of the crowd, holding up a cheap cassette player--no iPods, either--that was blaring out various Beatles and Lennon tunes. I politely pushed my way toward him. I handed him one of the flyers and asked if at an appropriate time he would let the people around him know about the rally. He looked at the flyer. The cassette player was playing "While My Guitar Gently Weeps." He said, No, you tell them. The song ended. He turned off the machine and said, "This guy has something he wants to say to you."

On the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, I made my first and only political speech. "We've just heard this song that says, 'After all this time, we must surely be learning," I began. "But are we? There are 10,000 handgun deaths a year. Are we learning how we can prevent that?" I noted that not only Lennon but other important members of our community had been killed by guns recently and that efforts to restrict guns routinely fail. "Why?" I asked. "Because people who work there"--I pointed across the Reflecting Pool toward the Capitol--"listen too much to the people over there"--I pointed in the direction of the NRA building. But, I added, now was an appropriate time to show that other Americans had different views. I asked the people there to come to the rally. And I'm afraid I said something corny like, "Imagine if everyone who feels as you do today showed up." When I was done, the scrawny fellow gave me a hug; the people applauded. I darted off to start putting up the flyers.

Besides working the grassroots, CAGV had a media strategy. I had fellow workers at the Center call up various media outlets--particularly radio stations that played rock music. They asked for the news or program director and then said something like, "I hear there's going to be a large protest outside the NRA headquarters in three days to commemorate the death of John Lennon and to call for sensible handgun control, and I want to go. Do you have any information on this?" Of course, they did not. But invariably the person on the other end of the phone said, No, but if you find out anything please let me know.

Hours later, I would call these media people and say, "I'm David Corn of Citizens Against Gun Violence, an ad hoc citizens group. I understand you're looking for information on the rally we're holding." Everyone was quite keen on listening to me. Several radio stations asked me to come into their studios to talk about the event. "Was I exploiting this tragedy to make a political point?" some asked. Yes, I said. The aim was to use this awful killing to advance policies that might prevent such another tragedy from occurring. Do you think, I countered, that John Lennon, the antiwar, antiviolence activist, would mind?

Word got out. People started calling from all over the region. Some students at a college--I believe it was in Pennsylvania--were renting a bus. I contacted the leading gun control advocates in Washington, convinced them this event was actually going to happen, and got them to commit to attending and speaking. Within a day or two, the office had unofficially become the headquarters of CAGV. Nader asked what was going on, but he didn't seem to mind. Nor did his chief of staff, John Richard.

The rally went off as planned. About one or two thousand people, I believe, showed up. There were camera crews, reporters from various newspapers. I put the professional handgun control advocates in front of the journalists; they gave the interviews. So too did relatives of Halberstam's brother and the community activist. All these people used the new bullhorn and spoke of the need for restraints on guns. I gave no speech. One woman approached me and said she had come because she had heard me on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. The bus from Pennsylvania (or wherever) arrived. Cars driving by honked.

The event--as far as such events go--was a success. There was media coverage. Those who had come felt they had done something with their grief and anger. And as almost always happens when a prominent act of gun violence occurs, the topic of handgun was again on the radar screen. Not because of our effort, but we had done our part. However, that moment--like all moments--quickly faded. It is now 25 years later. John Lennon is still dead. (And so is George Harrison.) The NRA years ago moved to a bigger and better headquarters in suburban Virginia. The gun lobby has had its ups and downs, but it's been mostly ups of late (such as the expiration of the ban on assault weapons). Lennon's death, it turns out, was no catalyst for action. And we have still--after all this time--not learned how to stem the tide of gun violence. Which is one of several reasons why this anniversary of Lennon's death is a sad day.

Posted by David Corn at 09:34 AM

December 07, 2006

Another Swing at the Baker Report; the Best Article on Iraq; An Important Nugget

Below is another take I did on the Iraq Study Group report, this one for the "Comment Is Free" group blog of The Guardian. But before you get to that, let me point you toward the best piece on Iraq I've read in years. It's by Bill Edmonds, a major in the US Army Special Forces who has served in Iraq, and the article appears on the website of The Nation magazine, my home base. Regular readers know that I don't often heap praise, and I am unfamiliar with the author. I will not spoil the reading experience by summarizing Edmonds' article. Just take my word and click here.

Also, tip of the virtual hat to my acquaintance, Jonathan Landay, a reporter for McClatchy Newspapers and one of the best national security journalists in Washington. He picked up on an important nugget in the Iraq Study Group report (one I wish I had spotted first):

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration routinely has underreported the level of violence in Iraq in order to disguise its policy failings, the Iraq Study Group report said Wednesday.

The bipartisan group called on the Pentagon and the director of the U.S. intelligence community to immediately institute a new reporting system that provides "a more accurate picture of events on the ground."

The finding bolsters allegations by Democratic lawmakers and other critics that the Bush administration has withheld or misconstrued intelligence that conflicted with its Iraq policy while promoting data and claims that supported its positions.

Those allegations date back to President Bush's contention before the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion that Saddam Hussein was hiding illegal nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. His claim proved to be unfounded.

Bush and his top officials have denied the allegations and accused the news media of exaggerating the violence between Iraqi Shiite and Sunni Muslims, minority Kurds and other groups.

The office of National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, who oversees all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, declined comment, saying it was studying the report.

On page 94 of its report, the Iraq Study Group found that there had been "significant under-reporting of the violence in Iraq." The reason, the group said, was because the tracking system was designed in a way that minimized the deaths of Iraqis.

"The standard for recording attacks acts a filter to keep events out of reports and databases," the report said. "A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count."

"Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals," the report continued.

The finding confirmed a Sept. 8 McClatchy Newspapers report that U.S. officials excluded scores of people killed in car bombings and mortar attacks from tabulations measuring the results of a drive to reduce violence in Baghdad.

By excluding that data, U.S. officials were able to boast that deaths from sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital had declined by more than 52 percent between July and August, McClatchy newspapers reported.

The ISG report said that U.S. officials reported 93 attacks or significant acts of violence on one day in July. "Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light more than 1,100 acts of violence," it said.

Read the rest here. Now on to my throat-clearing for The Guardian:

Yesterday morning, as I drove through Washington traffic toward Capitol Hill, I composed a list of questions to pose to former secretary of state James Baker at the press conference at which he and other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group would be releasing their much-anticipated report.

* After reviewing the Iraq war for nine months, Mr. Secretary can you state that President Bush - the man you helped reach the White House - has prosecuted this war wisely and competently as commander-in-chief?

* Why should American troops be asked to put their lives on the line to assist an Iraqi government that includes factions that either run or protect death squads?

* Can you envision President Bush, whom you know well, ever reaching the conclusion - even if the horrific situation in Iraq worsens - that he has created an insoluble problem, that the war cannot be won in any conventional sense, and that he is sending Americans to their deaths without achieving progress?

At the press conference, I was one of scores of reporters who raised a hand trying to attract Baker's attention and the chance to present a query, but I never caught the man's eye. After taking about a dozen questions, Baker and his commission colleagues ended the session and quickly departed the room.

But Baker and the ISG, in a way, answered my first query - while leaving the other two unaddressed. One of the money quotes from the report is this grim but unsurprising assessment: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." And the commission notes that a "new approach" and "different policies" are needed. It does not require advanced mathematics to equate these two propositions with an obvious message: Bush has messed up. After all, Baker and his band are saying that Bush's policies have not succeeded and ought to be supplanted by the plan concocted by the commission.

That plan calls for a slow withdrawal of combat troops as part of a shift in mission from combat operations to training and support activities aimed at bolstering Iraqi security forces. It also urges the Bush administration to press the Iraqi government to attain certain benchmarks-or face the loss of US support. And it calls on the president to initiate a robust diplomatic campaign to bring Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, into an effort to stabilize Iraq. The 79 recommendations of the report can be questioned on policy grounds. (I did some of that here.) And Baker and co-chairman Lee Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman, were quite careful to point out they cannot guarantee their proposals, if adopted, will lead to success. (Baker said the commission had deliberately chosen not to use the word "victory" in its report.) But the punch of the report was its obvious - though implied - criticism of Bush. It essentially says that he has led the US into what may be an unfixable mess and that Bush cannot extricate the country from this disaster on his own. It was akin to a no-confidence vote in Bush from leading members of the Republican elite.

But neither Baker, his fellow commissioners, nor the report confront the implications of this charge: whether Bush is capable of absorbing the proposals of the Iraq Study Group or any ideas beyond a stay-the-course strategy. And neither do the commissioners provide answers to the other questions in the abovementioned list. They note that Iraq is a broken society, riven with sectarian conflict, and that the Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds have reached a violent standoff. In such circumstances, where - and how - can US military power be applied to good end? The commissioners fixate on the training of Iraqi forces, a failed enterprise to date. But they do not advocate withdrawing combat forces until early 2008 and then only "subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground." What's the mission for the combat troops until then? Who's the enemy? Who are they fighting? The commission offers no insight on this crucial front.

The commissioners also do not grapple with the tough matter of when it might become no longer morally defensible to ask an American soldier to die for Bush's project in Iraq (if that point hasn't already been reached). At the press conference, Hamilton said, "We believe that the situation in Iraq today is very, very serious. We do not know if it can be turned around. But we think we have an obligation to try."

The report is imbued with this one-last-chance tone. But who decides when that chance is gone - if it remains? Over the past three years, pundits, politicians and experts have at various times declared that the Bush administration possessed one final opportunity and that the next few months would be crucial. Yet Iraq has not turned around; it only becomes a more hellish place and presents a more vexing dilemma. Baker's Iraq Study Group, which will now disband, is not willing to say Iraq is lost. But it tells us - between the lines - that the man in charge has created a problem for which there may be no answer. It is hard to imagine Bush adopting the group's main proposals, since he has previously dismissed them (including withdrawing troops to pressure the Iraqi government and talking to the Iranians and Syrians about Iraq). So it is hard to fathom this report making a last-chance difference, whether or not the recommendations have any merit. It's far easier to imagine the need for another Iraq Study Group six months down the line.

Posted by David Corn at 02:45 PM

December 06, 2006

Baker Report Slaps Bush...And Takes the Middle Ground

From my "Capital Games" column at www.thenation.com....

James Baker did not enter the Senate committee room bearing two tablets. But the Bush clan adviser and former secretary of state had high expectations to meet Wednesday morning when he and his fellow commissioners of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group publicly disclosed at a Capitol Hill press conference their collective wisdom on how to fix George W. Bush's war in Iraq--if, as they more than once noted, that's possible. Baker and his colleagues presented no surprises--given a week's worth of leaks about the report's findings. But they made it official: the Washington establishment has judged Bush's management of the war a failure.

No such bold statement exists in the 142-page report. And before the scores of reporters and dozens of camera crews, Baker, former Representative Lee Hamilton, and the eight other ISG poohbahs offered no harsh words for the fellow Baker got into the White House. Yet the report is unequivocal. "The situation in Iraq," it says, "is grave and deteriorating," and the Bush administration must "pursue different policies."

Citing such statements, I asked Democratic power-lawyer Vernon Jordan, one of the commisioners, if the report is an outright repudiation of Bush's handling of the war. Flashing a wide smile, he replied, "That's implicit." Baker has politely sent a message to Bush the Younger: you screwed up.

The report is both a political and policy document. By declaring that Bush's current approach is misguided, the Baker-Hamilton commission creates greater space for a debate over alternatives. Its report undermines Bush's recent claims that "we're winning" in Iraq and that he has "a strategy for victory." You're not and you don't, the report retorts (between the lines). This slap from Baker and the other Republican members (former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, former Senator Alan Simpson, and former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger) is significant. When has such a group of Washington influentials offered a stinging indictment--even if gently--of the defining mission of a president from their own party? This report comes close to being a vote of no confidence from the Republican elite.

Having dismissed Bush's prosecution of the war, Baker and his comrades try to fill the vacuum with 79 mostly middle-of-the-road policy recommendations. They do not side with the withdrawalists who urge initiating disengagement immediately or within months. ("Precipitous withdrawal," Baker maintained, "could lead to a blood bath and wider regional war.") They do not endorse the proposal from neoconservatives and Senator John McCain for dispatching more troops to Iraq. ("Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq," the report says, adding, "we do not have the troops.") They do not support dividing Iraq into parts. ("It could not be managed on an orderly basis," Baker said, and partition could cause "a humanitarian disaster or broad-based civil war.")

The commission calls for a pullback of combat troops by the first quarter of 2008--"subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground"--as part of shifting the U.S. military mission from combat to training and support operations. (Bush, the commission notes, should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.) This mission switch, according to the commission, must occur in tandem with a "diplomatic offensive to build consensus for stability in Iraq and the region"--an effort that would include approaching Iran and Syria and seeking "a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts." The Baker gang proposes creating an Iraq International Support Group that would involve all countries bordering Iraq and other nations in the region and world. The commission also recommends that the United States pressure the Iraqi government concerning "milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance." The report lists various benchmarks Washington should demand of the Iraqis, including passing a law governing oil revenue sharing (by early 2007), completing "reconciliation efforts" (by May 2007), gaining control of the army (by April 2007), and appreciating the value of the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat inflation (by the end of this year). And the pressure must be explicit. If the Iraqi government does not make "substantial progress," the report notes, the Bush administration "should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the government."

Is all this truly "a better way forward," as the report puts it? It certainly is better than the muddle-through approach of the Bush administration. The report lays out specific ways the US military should attempt to improve the training of Iraqi security forces--mainly by increasing the number of U.S. military personnel embedded with Iraqi units. And withdrawing combat troops is a key part of the plan. But one can easily pick apart the fundamental recommendations. The US military has already trained 300,000 Iraqi troops and police officers--or so Vice President Dick Cheney claims--and the program has been a failure. The report cites "significant questions" about the abilities and loyalties of Iraqi units. "The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi army," the ISG concludes. Is there reason to believe that a new round of training of security forces in this highly fractured state can be done in a manner that works?

The same goes for other recommendations. The report urges both supporting and applying pressure on "the Iraqi government." Is Bush nimble enough to do this? More important, is the Iraqi government truly a working and viable entity that can be effectively assisted and nudged simultaneously? "Key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest," the report says. "Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively." It adds that sectarian militias "are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political action." The report sums up a primary obstacle:

Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.

How to break this deadlock? The report does not say. And Baker conceded that Iran might have no interest in participating in a diplomatic endeavor designed to stabilize Iraq. He was more optimistic about Syria: "With respect to Syria, there's some strong indications that they would be in a position if we were able to enter into a constructive dialogue, that they could--would be in a position to help us and might want to help us."

At the press conference, Baker, Hamilton and Company discussed political divisions in the United States more than they did those in Iraq. They repeatedly echoed the report's call for the forging of a bipartisan political consensus on Iraq. Baker, the commissions and their report point to the divisive debate within the United States as a critical problem. Whether that's so or not, they left untouched a bigger matter: will Bush listen (to them or anyone else) and chart a different course?

The commissioner met with Bush prior to the press conference, and Hamilton said he was "immensely pleased today when President Bush indicated to us that this report presents to the American people a common opportunity to deal with the problems in Iraq." But the report is more than an "opportunity." It's a specific plan resting on ideas Bush and his aides have already shoved aside. The Bush White House has indicated it has no interest in discussing the Iraq mess with Iran and Syria. Bush has repeatedly stuck with an open-ended commitment: US troops will stay in Iraq until the mission is completed. The Baker commission--as limited as its recommendations may be--is asking Bush to change policy in a dramatic fashion. Does Bush, one reporter asked, "have the capacity to pull a 180?" Baker replied, "I never put presidents I work for on the couch."

But--couch or no couch--that is the question. Bush's intentions are more important than the middle-of-the-road/give-it-one-more-shot particulars of the ISG recommendations. The commission is going out of business. Its members will be testifying before various congressional panels in the weeks and months ahead. But they will not be pressing Bush in any organized way to adopt their proposals--or to alter his own approach. What matters more than the merits of Recommendation No. 37 ("Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch") is whether Bush accepts the report's fundamentals--Iraq is getting worse and his policies have failed--and whether he is willing to reconsider what to do in Iraq.

At the press conference, Baker talked about improving the "chances for success," not about victory. "We stayed away" from using the word "victory," he said. Hamilton observed, "I don't know if [Iraq] can be turned around." No one connected to the commission positioned him- or herself as a policy savior. "There is no guarantee for success in Iraq," the Baker report says, noting that "the ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out." Baker readily acknowledges his panel's recommendations might not do the trick. There's little hubris within the report.

On the first page, the panel notes, "Our leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support." That suggests "our leaders"--meaning the president--has not been so. To their credit, the ISG commissioners frankly concede--all too willingly--that their proposals might not work. But now that the Baker report is finally done and the Bush family's Mr. Fixit has declared no magical solution exists, the Iraq debate reverts to the basics: can Bush candidly admit Iraq is a debacle and can he ponder meaningful alternatives to the present course? For that question, there's no answer from the wise men (and one wise woman) of Baker's study group.

Posted by David Corn at 03:14 PM

December 05, 2006

Gates Hearing: We're Not Winning

From an October 25, 2006 White House press conference:

Q: Mr. President, the war in Iraq has lasted almost as long as World War II for the United States. And as you mentioned, October was the deadliest month for American forces this year -- in a year. Do you think we're winning, and why?

President Bush: ...I am confident we will succeed. I am confident we'll succeed in Iraq.....Defeat will only come if the United States becomes isolationist and refuses to, one, protect ourselves, and, two, help those who desire to become -- to live in a moderate, peaceful world. And it's a hard struggle, no question about it. And it's a different struggle.

Q: Are we winning?

President Bush: Absolutely, we're winning.

From today's Senate armed services committee's confirmation hearing for Robert Gates, Bush's nominee for defense secretary:

Senator Carl Levin: Do you believe we are currently winning in Iraq?

Robert Gates: No, sir.

Levin, a sharp critic of the Pentagon and the administration, noted that Gates' admission was "a refreshing breath of reality." That's so. But what's needed is a hurricane-force gust of reality that will move through the Pentagon and the White House. In other words, how hard can Gates blow?

Senator Ted Kennedy, another committee member, pointed out that on November 5, Bush declared, "We got a strategy for victory [in Iraq] that will work." Yet Gates told the committee that Bush wants him "to take a fresh look and all options are on the table." Why worry, then, about "fresh looks" and "options" if a "strategy for victory" is already in place? Isn't there a contradiction here? Kennedy wondered. Gates assured Kennedy that he intends to be not a "bump on a log" but an "independent voice." The question remains: is the commander in chief prepared to listen to such a voice? But that's not a question for Gates. At least, not yet.

Posted by David Corn at 11:02 AM

December 04, 2006

Is Everyone Now a Cut-and-Runner?

A few "above the line" options from the memo written by Donald Rumsfeld on November 6 and leaked recently to The New York Times:

* Retain high-end SOF [special operations forces] capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

* Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions--cities, patrolling, etc.--and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.

* Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start "taking our hand off the bicycle seat"), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Does this make Rumsfeld a cut-and-run defeatist who wants "the terrorists" to win? Remember, George Bush, Dick Cheney and Karl Rove have tried to defame proponents of troop withdrawals as quasi-traitors who yearn for ignoble defeat in Iraq. But Rummy--on his way out--noted that a strategic shift in Iraq might require some type of troop pullout. (In the memo, he did not note whether he favored any particular option.) And the Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton will release a report Wednesday reportedly calling for a conditional withdrawal that aims to get US troops out of Iraq by early 2008 (if circumstances on the ground permit). Is everyone now a defeat-hankering cut-and-runner?

It's easy for war critics to dismiss the Baker report, for its withdrawal call is vague and wishy-washy. But the key point to keep in mind is that a foreign policy consensus is slowly forming: pulling back troops is part of any quasi-solution to the hellish mess Bush has created in Iraq. Except within the White House. Bush says, of course, he'd like to see troops come home--but only after "the mission is completed." Rumsfeld, Baker, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, congressional Democrats and others are either considering or arguing that disengagement (in some form) cannot wait until a mythical completion of a the "mission" occurs. This is the great divide that is forming within Washington. And on Bush's side, it's getting pretty lonely.

Posted by David Corn at 11:21 AM

December 01, 2006

Baker Puts Bush in a Corner

From my "Capital Games" column at www.thenation.com....

It's crunch time for George W. Bush.

He has to decide whether or not to change his Iraq policy, as James Baker, his father's secretary of state, weighs in with a report that applies much pressure on him. According to Friday's edition of The Washington Post, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group chaired by Baker and former Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton will recommend next week that Bush withdraws nearly all US combat troops from Iraq by early 2008. Baker's group attaches qualifiers to its call for this redeployment, noting such a drawdown should occur only if circumstances on the ground permit it. (And this pullout would be accompanied by moves aimed at enhancing US support of Iraqi military units, such as embedding US troops within Iraqi units.) But even Baker's conditional call for disengagement is a sharp retort to Bush, who has repeatedly dismissed the notion of withdrawing troops until, as he puts it, "the mission is completed." The commission's report--if the leaked accounts are correct--will send a message to Bush: Iraq is not working, you must shift strategies.

The simple question is, will he? Doing so would be an admission that he has botched the job. Bush may not be willing to--or able to--concede that difficult point. But his father's crowd--and their Democratic partners on the panel--is telling him straight-up that his Iraq project (the defining element of his presidency) is failing. Can Bush process this?

The congressional Democratic leadership has been much helped by Baker's panel. Though the Democrats have not forged a consensus position, most have backed some version of withdrawal. The Baker report will provide them plenty of political cover. After all, can Karl Rove attack Baker and fellow commission members Edwin Meese III (Ronald Reagan's attorney general), Sandra Day O'Connor (a former Supreme Court justice nominated by Reagan), and Alan Simpson (former Republican senator) as cut-and-rum wimps who want the terrorists to win? Talking about withdrawing US troops (and transforming the mission in Iraq from combat to support) is now perfectly respectable. Bush, Dick Cheney and administration aides have been nudged into a corner.

The Iraq Study Group "embraced everything we asked for," gloats one Democratic Senate staffer. During the group's deliberation, Senator Harry Reid, the incoming Senate majority leader, and Senator Carl Levin, the Democrat who will assume chairmanship of the armed services committee, met with Baker and the commissioners. Reid and Levin presented them with a memo that called for starting a phased withdrawal, initiating a regional diplomatic initiative, and appointing a special envoy. "It looks like the Baker report is an endorsement of our position," this Senate aide says. "It's aligned with our call for a change in direction. Baker-Hamilton will add to the momentum for change."

As conditional as the commission's withdrawal recommendation might be, its report is indeed a slap at Bush. It also undermines conservatives--such as Senator John McCain--who have proposed sending far more troops to Iraq, and the report undercuts neocons who have dismissed the idea of engaging Iran and Syria in the effort to stabilize Iraq.

The Baker-Hamilton commission has not come up with a roadmap to success. Pulling out US combat troops could be accompanied by greater chaos and conflict in Iraq--and perhaps in the region. (In a Washington Post op-ed several days ago, Saudi adviser Nawaf Obaid warned that Saudi Arabia might intervene in Iraq to protect Sunnis--even if this could lead to war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.) But Baker has rendered a harsh judgment on the son's war. He has shifted the debate. Withdrawal--of some kind--is now the majority position.

Will Bush acknowledge this new reality? Or might he become a Captain Queeg-like character, isolated in his adherence to a discredited and failing policy of muddling through? Bush does remain the commander in chief. Until congressional Democrats become bold enough to challenge his conduct of the war by withholding funds for it (a point that most Democrats are not yet near), Bush gets to call the shots in Iraq. He and Cheney can ignore Baker's advice. But now that the Baker report is out, Bush has a fundamental choice: to admit he has messed up and change direction or to stay the course (even though he's no longer allowed to use that term). For whatever faults the Baker report might have, Baker deserves credit for pushing Bush the Younger--whose presidency Baker enabled by winning the Florida recount battle--to this moment of reckoning, even if it's a moment Bush refuses to recognize.

******

NEW INTELL CHAIR: On Friday morning, House Speaker-to-be Nancy Pelosi named Representative Silvestre Reyes chairman of the House intelligence committee. There's nothing objectionable about Reyes, but she missed an opportunity to make a stellar choice by picking Representative Rush Holt for the post. To learn why, see my recent column on this matter here.

Posted by David Corn at 12:02 PM