Once again, Anthony Cordesman--the hawkish military analyst at the Center for Strategic & International Studies--has accused the Bush administration of misleading the public about the harsh realities of Iraq. Every few months, he produces a report that socks it to the White House and the Pentagon. And he has new one out today. The paper starts:

Iraq is already in a state of at least limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba'ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi'ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure, leading to a Shi'ite or Shi'ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq's Sunnis. It could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups. If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.

Who's to blame for the mess? Cordesman doesn't hold back:

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the US has never implemented a realistic, self-critical, or forward-looking approach to any aspect of its policy in Iraq. It is unclear that it could have succeeded under the best of circumstance, and one of its most critical failures has been to consistently deny the fact it was pursuing a high effort in nation building and
stability operations that could easily fail.

In practice, however, the US has neither anticipated the problems it must solve or rapidly learned and adapted to the emerging realities in Iraq. Its national security leadership has become a self-inflicted wound, and the US has lurched from delayed response to response, always reacting too slowly, with two few resources and changes, and in a state
of quasi-denial.

He blasts the Bush administration for trumpeting its policy of standing up an Iraqi security force so the U.S. can stand down. The development of an effective ISF can only occur, he notes, if there is progress in the bigger game: achieving a viable government. Yet, he writes, the "present reality is that progress in Iraq is slow or faltering in each of the areas
necessary to make Iraqi force development successful."

Even when it comes to the attempt to create a working Iraqi security force, Cordesman notes, there's no way to tell if the Pentagon is making any headway:

Progress is difficult to gauge, because so much US reporting grossly exaggerates progress, ignores or understates real-world problems, and promises unrealistic timelines. The US Defense Department has stopped releasing detailed unclassified material about Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement readiness, only giving information about how many units are "ready and equipped" and "in the lead." These are vague, if not meaningless categories – "in the lead" does not indicate the level of independence from US support, and we do not how many "ready and equipped" soldiers quit or deserted the force.

He also says:

To put it bluntly, the US government and Department of Defense must stop lying about the true nature of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development....Like all elements of strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and realism, not "spin," false claims, and political expediency.

Cordesman maintains that there may still be a way to win in Iraq. This will take time and the continued presence of U.S. troops, he writes, and success will depend on the resolution of the internal political conflicts:

Things can only go well, however, if Iraq can create a working compromise between its sects and ethnic groups, and if US and other outside powers will have the patience and will to support Iraq as it develops into such a state for at least two to three more years of active fighting. Iraq will also need massive additional economic aid to help Iraq unify and develop. Major assistance and advisory programs will be in place until at least 2010, and probably 2015.

These are big ifs. Cordesman is no optimist. He writes, "The present odds of such success are less than even." More likely, Iraq will end up in "years of turmoil," with no particular sect triumphing--or the nation will become divided into parts, officially or informally. His report is rather somber reading. (James Baker, take note.) Cordesman is no fan of withdrawing troops. But he describes a situation that has been so screwed up by the Bush administration that victory--however that might be defined--may well be beyond reach.

Posted by David Corn at November 27, 2006 12:59 PM